The major line in Soviet-German relations, which emerged after the conclusion of the Pact on August 23rd, was confirmed by the course of events in September and the signing of the Treaty on September 28th. Its development continued during October — December 1939 and in the first half of 1940. It can be traced both in the bilateral relations between the Soviet Union and Germany and in its assessment by both sides. Cooperation between the countries continued until the beginning of the Great Patriotic War. Between 1939 and 1941, Stalin supplied Hitler with 1.5 million tons of oil, 1.5 million tons of grain, and several thousand tons of rubber, wood, phosphates, iron and other metal ores such as chromium, manganese, and platinum. It was supplies from the USSR that helped Germany overcome the blockade of the allies and capture Europe. The Nazis were short on their own resources. The last echelon with Soviet grain for Germany passed through the Western Bug river to Terespol on June 22, 1941 — 1 hour 15 minutes before the attack on the USSR.
Immediately after signing the treaty Ribbentrop sent a message to Berlin with a request to immediately deliver it to the Fuhrer. In it, he informed about the negotiations held in Moscow and noted their "friendly tone".
On September 30, the state Secretary of German foreign ministry Weizsäcker, in the first circular sent to the German embassies noted that German-Russian relations had been restored in the spirit of historical friendship. “The ideologies of the two countries, — noted in the circular, — remain unchanged, and it would be unwise to concern this issue in the Treaty” Three days later Hitler held a meeting with Italian foreign minister Ciano in Berlin, during which the German leader reported on the results of the negotiations in Moscow and gave his assessment of the international situation. It is quite remarkable that the “Polish question” took the greatest part of this extensive discussion. Hitler in detail outlined the course of military action on the German-Polish front, describing the German military power in the most excellent terms. Interlocutors discussed in great detail the future of the Polish state, with Hitler clearly evading Chiano's questions about the degree of independence and size of Poland in the future. Hitler made the solution of all these questions dependent on the course of war and the perspectives for peace in the future.
Talking about the treaty with Russia, the Fuhrer stressed that their goal was to determine the areas of influence in the acquired territories. Germany is not interested, - he said, - to have a hostile neighbor behind its back, and now the situation has become clear and cause for possible conflicts and misunderstandings in the future has been removed. Russia receives the exclusive right on the political and economic structure of the territory to the East of the new border line, and Germany — to the West of it. According to Hitler, Germany had two reasons to abolish the boundaries of the Treaty of Versailles: establishing acceptable boundaries for its ethnographic, historical and economic goals, and creating in the remaining Polish territories such an order that would never threaten the Reich. Discussion of general questions of the war on the Western front and the perspectives of the future world took a significant place in the conversation. Hitler was going to cover these topics during his speech in Reichstag that he had planned for October. Attention is drawn to Hitler's proposal for Italy to try to form a bloc of neutral States, apparently, so that they would not enter the Anglo-French coalition.
By the end of the conversation Hitler returned to the topic of Russia. He emphasized, that Germany “wants to stay in peace with Russia, as it has been doing for several centuries”. Implementation of this was to be supported by the fact that Russia had traditionally feared close contacts with the West, following its developed own culture and way of life. According to Fuhrer’s opinion, this example of the division of spheres of interest with Russia could be the basis for the same action in the Mediterranean (which was to become the zone of Italian influence) and in Central Europe (Austria and Czechoslovakia — accordingly the zone of German influence) and so on. Thus, this principle and practice of division of spheres of interest took a very significant place in German foreign policy. Generally, during October — November 1939, Soviet-German relations developed in the following areas:
- elaboration of economic and trade relations, taking into account previous agreements and special arrangements of the end of September;
- exchange of opinions on the problems arising from the Soviet actions in the Baltic States;
- preparation for possible cooperation in the military-technical sphere;
- discussion of general issues related to the problems of war and peace, politics of England, France and the United States;
- the situation in the Balkans and relations with Turkey began to occupy an important place.
14 - 15 September, German diplomat and the representative of the previous economic negotiations with the Soviet Union Schnurre had a long conversation with Ribbentrop concerning economic and trade relations with Moscow before his following trip to the Soviet Union. They mostly discussed the implementation of the agreement on loans and trade of August 19. According to Schnurre, the agreement was not concretized. Schnurre raised the question of Germany's interest in receiving raw materials from the Soviet Union as soon as possible (about 180 million Deutsche marks in value). He also reported that he saw his main task in the upcoming negotiations in finding out whether Moscow could cover German needs for imports by sea and if so, to what extent. According to the requests of military and civilian agencies, Germany urgently needed supplies for the amount of 70 million marks. Schnurre intended, the following conclusion can be drawn from his dossier, to make a proposal to Moscow, as part of the Treaty from August 19, to supply Germany with raw materials worth 10 million marks, both produced in Russia and purchased by it for Germany from neutral countries. Further on, he noted that compensation for these supplies shouldn't have followed immediately, it was to be associated with the investment program in Russia, designed for five years.
In this regard, the German diplomat foresaw difficulties in the upcoming talks in Moscow precisely because Germany wanted to receive Russian supplies in advance, prior to payment. A positive solution to this issue, in his opinion, depended on the highest Russian authorities, which were expected to demonstrate how far Stalin was ready to go in following the new political course. At the same time, he expressed understanding that the supply of raw materials was not an easy task for Russia due to internal difficulties, particularly food shortage issues. Schnurre also emphasized the desirability of resolving the issue of transit of supplies to Germany from Iran, Afghanistan, Manchuria and Japan via Russian territory on the negotiations.
Аrom the abovementioned it becomes obvious, the German representatives approached economic relations with the Soviet Union purely pragmatically, not really considering the Soviet interests. Hitler did not plan to attack Russia, but Stalin left him no second choice.